"...may safely say that one of the most successful, and certainly one of the most profitable, steamers that sailed out of Havana to the Confederate States was a somewhat old, and by no means a fast, steamer, named the Denbigh. This vessel ran for a considerable time between Havana and Mobile; but when the latter was captured by the Federals she ran to Galveston, to and from which port she made such regular trips that she was called "the packet." She was small in size, and not high above water, and painted in such a way was not to be readily seen from a distance. She ws light on coal, made but little smoke, and depended more on strategy than speed. She carried large cargoes of cotton, and it was generally allowed that the little Denbigh was a more profitable boat than any of the larger and swifter cracks."
William Watson, The Adventures of a Blockade Runner, 1892
There exists some debate among scholars as to just how profitable blockade running really was. There are innumerable anecdotes about fortunes made in the business, but other researchers have pointed out that the vast majority of ships known to have run the blockade made only a single voyage -- if the profits being made were so large, they ask, why did so many vessels and their owners abandon the trade after a single attempt? Theirs are valid questions, which may have no easy answers.
What does seem true beyond doubt, though, was that Denbigh was a very profitable ship. Through a combination of factors, including the skill of her officers and good old-fashioned luck, Denbigh m. anaged to make trip after trip through the Federal blockade, each time giving her owners a little bit bigger return on their original investment. On average, a steam blockade runner in 1864-65 could reasonably expect to make one or two successful round trips through the blockade before being caught; Denbigh did it again and again, for a near-record total of thirteen round voyages.
So how profitable was Denbigh? It's impossible to say with certainty, as only fragmentary records survive that document her cargoes and operations in detail. It is possible, however, to make some educated guesses about Denbigh's costs and revenues, and to use these to make a rough estimate at the sort of returns she might have brought her owners:
Note: The figures that follow do not represent known data for Denbigh. They are speculative, based on a variety of sources the Denbigh Project team believes to be reliable. They are included here for illustrative purposes only.
Perhaps the most critical element in assessing Denbigh's potential profitability is to remember who her owners were. Denbigh was owned by the European Trading Company, a consortium of three firms: Emile Erlanger and Co. of Paris, J. H. Schröder & Co. of Manchester, England and H. O. Brewer &. Co. of Mobile, Alabama. The first two of these, who undoubtedly put up the lion's share of the money required to purchase and outfit the ship and hire her crew, were perfectly situated to exploit the unique business opportunity presented by the Federal blockade of the Confederacy. Erlanger and Schröder had shortly before organized the so-called "Erlanger Loan," issuing almost £2 million worth of bonds that could be redeemed for cotton in any Southern port. While the Erlanger Loan was a stimulus to blockade running generally -- bond holders had to risk the blockade in order to exchange their bonds for the tangible commodity of cotton -- it was an irresistible opportunity for Erlanger and Schröder, because they could exchange their own bonds for Confederate cotton. For all intents and purposes, they were printing their own money.